Creature of Congress

Still from the suddenly-lonely, remotely-operated color television camera on Apollo 17's lunar rover, minutes after the launch and departure of Cernan & Schmitt, December 14, 1972. Recent Narrow-Angle Camera (LROC) images from NASA's Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter demonstrate the Apollo-era artifacts on the Moon appear undisturbed [NASA/A17-ASJ].

The Authorized Version

Paul D. Spudis
The Once & Future Moon
Smithsonian Air & Space

NASA’s new authorization bill (S.3729) was passed by Congress before they cleared out of town and will soon be signed by the President, codifying into law the federal government’s formal abandonment of the Vision for Space Exploration. In its place is a mish-mosh of platitudes, entitlement programs, pontificating blither about “unique” missions, commercial aerospace welfare and most significantly, an utter lack of direction for our national space program.

I’ve already heard the reaction to the sentiments above, as the space blogosphere has hashed and rehashed space access, space direction and space pork and now is left with – what? Defensively, we’re told, “The new bill does too have direction!! We’re going to Mars! We’re going to a near-Earth asteroid!! We’ll develop new, “game-changing, leap-ahead” technologies to make spaceflight easier and cheaper – that will take us there sooner! The commercial sector will develop new, ultra-affordable launch vehicles to allow the movement of humanity into space!” They will just … “Make it so.”

A statement that “Mars is the ultimate destination” is not programmatic direction, but rather an exhausted platitude, unsupported by any facts in evidence. We do not now have the technology, the will or the national wealth to expend on a human Mars mission and will not for decades. The idea that some new “magic beans” technology will spontaneously arise to enable a human mission is technically illiterate. The quasi-religious belief by some in the efficacy of “New Space” efforts to provide routine and inexpensive access to LEO is touching, but unsupported by any evidence. It is certainly true that many NASA programs have cost more and taken longer then promised or planned, but that’s been the nature of the space business since its founding 50 years ago. At least NASA had a track record of building and flying spacecraft, under a variety of difficult technical and fiscal conditions. But for now, NASA’s manned space workforce has been told to make tracks for other employment.

The likely effect of the proposed new “direction” for NASA by this administration has been apparent to many of us for some time now – the end of human spaceflight by this nation. Although some of us suspect that this shattering of a national capability is all quite deliberate, motives do not matter at this stage. The new authorization bill makes some significant changes to the administration’s proposal. The only pertinent question is, can pieces of the space program be picked up and re-assembled again, sometime in the future after years of destructive non-activity? It is in this vein that I want to examine some of the language of the new authorization bill.

The most prescriptive part of the new authorization is its language dealing with a new NASA-developed heavy lift launch vehicle (HLV) and a Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV), replacements for the now-terminated Project Constellation. The launch vehicle description reads as though the authors of the bill had some solution (or range of solutions) in mind, a surmise supported by the requirement that the agency use “existing Shuttle parts and infrastructure to the maximum extent possible.” The specific requirement is for a vehicle with a payload capacity of 70 to 100 metric tonnes to LEO, capable of growth to 130 mT, including a possible “Earth departure stage.” It is further specified that this vehicle be capable of launching the MPCV into orbit and to supply cargo and crew to the ISS.

The crew vehicle description is a little more vague, as befits a spacecraft with no defined mission. Although it is specified that the MPCV shall be capable of conducting missions beyond LEO, its primary mission seems to be crew and cargo delivery to the ISS. In addition, it must be capable of supporting “rendezvous, docking, extra-vehicular activity” and “servicing of assets” in “cislunar space” (interesting wording that). The bill goes on to define the intent of this provision in another section (804) related to making space-based telescopes (like the James Webb telescope at Earth-Sun L-2) serviceable by humans. But by using the term “cislunar,” it may well be that something else might be lurking in the background.

The prefacing language in the bill (the seven “findings” of the Senate) is even more interesting (Section 301a). Cislunar space is mentioned in 4 of the 7 provisions of the prefacing section; human lunar surface presence is mentioned in 3 of those 7 sections. Strange language for an authorization bill that “abandons the Moon as a destination,” as claimed in many press reports. What should we make of this unusual language and phrasing?

I think that the bill’s provisions for a NASA-developed HLV and crew spacecraft reflect a fundamental ambivalence on the part of Congress for the “new direction” adumbrated by the administration last spring. It would seem some healthy skepticism exists as to whether a purely commercial solution to human LEO access is possible or even desirable. In addition, although the President is now famous for remarking that a return to the Moon is pointless because “we’ve been there,” someone on the Hill fortunately recognized the lack of understanding embodied in that statement.

The bill’s wording about human access to “cislunar space,” as well as the mention of “in situ resource utilization” indicates that some in Congress are not blind to the wealth of knowledge recently acquired showing that the poles of the Moon contain abundant water – material useful to those countries willing to go after it in order to achieve affordable space faring capability and routine access to cislunar space, where all advanced countries’ satellite assets reside.

In short, I detect in the new authorization bill the hand of someone in the bowels of the committees – a staffer perhaps – who has perceptively salvaged a slender thread of capability for the use of some future national leader, one that supports a robust American space program. I note that the authorization calls for a report in 90 days on how the agency proposes to implement the new plan. Somebody will be watching them.

Congress as rocket designers

Creature of Congress: The Ares V heavy-lift, last seen in 2007 and as part of the Constellation program. Thrown out with the bath water in abandoning Constellation in FY2011, does the congressional consensus for NASA now call for the same vehicle, with no Altair to fly, or is Congress looking for something similar to the Saturn 1-B? [NASA]

Jeff Foust
Space Politics

While the Senate version of the NASA authorization bill, S. 3729, made it clear that the heavy-lift launch vehicle it calls for, the Space Launch System, should be developed by “extend[ing] or modify[ing] existing vehicle development and associated contracts”, it wasn’t specific beyond that in terms of vehicle design.

However, as Space News reported Friday, the report accompanying the bill goes into additional detail about their desired vehicle design.

Read the Post, HERE.

Griffin’s critique of NASA’s new direction

Former NASA administrator Mike Griffin was less critical than in months past, speaking to a conference of the International Mars Society in Dayton, Ohio, Friday. The House committee plan for NASA FY2011 , he said, was better than the Senate's, and plans preliminarily approved in both chambers were superior to plans promoted by the White House [File photo: CSM, April 2009].

Jeff Foust
The Space Review

Former NASA administrators are not generally known for being outspoken about space policy after their tenures running the agency...Mike Griffin, however, is not content to remain quiet during this period of upheaval in space policy. The administrator who oversaw the formation and initial development of the Constellation architecture—most notably the Ares 1 rocket and Orion capsule—is clearly not happy to see the White House and even Congress willing to dismantle part or all it in favor of a new approach to human space exploration.

Griffin started his speech by first reviewing the administration’s proposed plan for NASA, and his take on it—which, not unexpectedly, wasn’t particularly positive. One area of concern he expressed was the plan by the White House to defer a decision on a heavy-lift vehicle (HLV) to no later than 2015. “I would ask you to note the timing,” Griffin said: a 2015 decision would come near the end of President Obama’s second and final term (assuming he wins reelection in 2012), and thus the funding decisions would be put in the lap of his successor. “By the time there was any budget year that would actually have to support the development of a real heavy-lift rocket, the president who is promising to do it will be gone,” he said.

Read the full report, HERE.

The Apollo Model & FY 2011

Four days shy of six months out of office, former President Lyndon Johnson (right) watches the launch of Apollo 11, together with Lady Bird Johnson and Apollo 10 Cmdr. Thomas P. Stafford, Jr., July 16, 1969. Whatever else might be said of LBJ, no single politician can be more credited for the creation of NASA as a civilian space agency or for shepherding the national resources necessary to achieving the Apollo lunar landings, as Senate majority leader, Vice President and President. Like Johnson, NASA is a "creature of Congress" [NASA].

“Today outer space is free. It is unscarred by conflict. It must remain this way… Men who have worked together to reach the stars are not likely to descend together into the depths of war and desolation.” Senate majority leader Lyndon B. Johnson (D-TX), 1958

Taylor Dinerman
Hudson New York

Perhaps the primary goal of the Obama administration's 2011 budget NASA proposal was to kill, once and for all, the Apollo Moon mission model that has determined the way the US space agency operates for nearly the last 60 years.

The so-called compromise proposal that unanimously passed the Senate Commerce Committee on July 15th gutted most of the Obama proposal. The House version does even more damage to the administration's proposal. While the Bush era Constellation program would seem to be dead, at least in name, its substance has survived for at least another year. There is a lesson here, not only for those who would reform NASA, but also for those who want to reform any reasonably sized government agency.

The first lesson is: Do not ignore Congress. NASA as it exists is the product of decades of Congressional action. Reformers may believe that they know what the agency needs, but without Congressional support, they have no hope of making a difference...

Read the article, HERE.

Is the Moon really 'Been there, done that?'

Like Viking settlements in Maritime Canada abandoned centuries before Columbus, forty years after the Apollo era six lunar module descent stages stand lonely near the foot prints where twelve Americans became the first to scratch the lunar surface. Now as then, there are those who question the value of exploring the Moon. The unquestioned scientific value of those earlier excursions was eclipsed by their geopolitical triumph. But, in the early years of the 21st century we have discovered better reasons for returning to the Moon than during the century prior to Apollo. The Moon appears to be an essential key to Deep Space, to our understanding the history of the Solar System, and no understanding of Earth can hope to be complete before a proper exploration of Earth's Moon.

Nancy Atkinson
Universe Today

If there's only one thing we've learned from all the highly successful recent Moon missions – the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter, LCROSS, Chandrayaan-1 and Kaguya — it's that the Moon is perplexingly different from our perceptions of the past 40 years. The discovery of water and volatiles across the surface and in the permanently shadowed regions at the poles changes so many of the notions we've had about Earth's constant companion. Basically, just within the past year we've realized the Moon is not a dry, barren, boring place, but a wetter, richer and more interesting destination than we ever imagined. And so, the proposal for NASA to effectively turn away from any human missions to the Moon, as well as Administrator Charlie Bolden's 'been there, done that' comments is quite perplexing – especially for the lunar scientists who have been making these discoveries.

"It's been quite a year for the Moon," said Clive Neal, a lunar geologist from Notre Dame, speaking last week at the NASA Lunar Science Institute's annual Lunar Forum at Ames Research Center. "And things got quite depressing around February 2010."

That's when President Obama proposed a new budget that effectively would end the Constellation program and a return to the Moon.

At the Forum, lunar scientists shared their most recent findings – as well as their attempts to model and comprehend all the data that is not yet understood. But they saved any discussion of NASA's future until the final presentation of the meeting.

"Hopefully this talk will stop you from running out of here ready to hang yourself or slit your wrists," quipped Neal, who led the final session.

The week began, however, with keynote speaker Andrew Chaikin – author of the Apollo 'bible,' "A Man on the Moon," and several other space-related books — saying, "We have to erase that horrendous 'been there done that' notion." Chaikin also shared a famous Peanuts cartoon showing Lucy pulling the football out from under from Charlie Brown. No caption was needed for everyone to understand to what Chaikin was referring.

"With all of these new discoveries, we should have ample reason to believe that humans will follow," said Chaikin. But right now, he added, the man in the Moon looks a little like Rodney Dangerfield. "The Moon wants – and deserves – respect."

Read the article, HERE.

NASA's new mission and the cult of management

Paul D. Spudis

The Once and Future Moon

Smithsonian Air & Space

During a recent interview on Al Jazeera television, NASA Administrator Charles Bolden outlined NASA’s new priorities. His remarks became headlines as the previously ignored story about the redirection of the space agency toward international diplomatic outreach and global climate change research finally reached the many who still hold NASA in high regard. Beyond the inane and vacuous policy comments, one statement by Administrator Bolden went virtually unnoticed: “We’re not going to go anywhere beyond low Earth orbit as a single entity,” he revealed, “The United States can’t do it.” If it’s possible to shock Americans into paying attention to NASA and our national space program, those words might do it.

It’s one thing to assert that the Unites States desires more international collaboration as a matter of policy for reasons of fostering alliances, developing new cultural ties, or even to promote world peace. It’s an entirely different proposition to assert that the United States has lost the ability to reach for the stars, that America is incapable of exploring space alone. Have we become comfortable with the idea that it’s politically incorrect to have pride in our nation’s abilities – past, present and future?

The natural reaction of many Americans is to strongly protest such a notion by asserting that our technology is the greatest in the world and that we can design and build anything we choose to. However, one can not escape the reality that the statement quoted above was made by the head of the agency charged with sending U.S. astronauts into space, a task that Americans have watched NASA carry out for almost 50 years. A more troubling thought is that maybe he is right.

I’ve worked with NASA for 25 years on experiments, research, and advanced planning and missions. I’ve been involved with studies to put a base on the Moon since 1984 (the year of the first conference on lunar bases at the National Academy of Sciences in Washington DC). In all of these efforts, I believed that our future in space was at stake and that we were preparing for humanity’s return to the Moon, followed by journeys to the planets.

As the years wore on, it began to dawn on some of us that some within and outside the agency really didn’t want to go anywhere or do anything in space. Working for NASA means being involved in the process of working. How you structure a project, who gets assigned what work and how many meetings you conduct is the formula that elevates you faster than when (or even if) you deliver a product, a mission or a program. This culture becomes even more evident as one ascends the chain of command. The farther up the organizational ladder you go, the further removed from the productive segment of the agency you are, with product being replaced by an ever multiplying and bewildering variety of workshops, seminars and management training retreats. There exists in America today a thriving industry dedicated to convincing people who have no organizational or management skills that in fact, they are all excellent organizers and managers. Much of this sub-culture is accurately (and hilariously) portrayed in the comic strip Dilbert.

Management fads like Total Quality Management regularly come and go. NASA has dabbled in Faster-Cheaper-Better, Spiral Development, Earned Value Management, and many others. Each new initiative is unveiled as The Answer, the magic beans solution that will re-establish the NASA of our forefathers – smart, productive, innovative, and competent. Management thrives by producing more middle managers. People joke about highway projects where one guy digs a hole while five others lean on their shovels, watching him work. That old chestnut always gets a laugh because we’ve all seen it at some point. You see it a lot within NASA. As administrative cost consumes more and more of the budget pie, the slice that represents funding for the productive sector of the agency keeps shrinking.

Bolden’s comment is tragic, not in its misunderstanding but in its verity. America cannot go back to the Moon by itself not because we lack the wealth or the technical skills but because we have developed a culture of management bloat and process-orientation that proliferates bureaucracy. NASA is comfortably cushioned from the reality of their organizational maladies by the amazing legacy inherited from those who did great things in the past. They may believe they’re immune to the Cult of Management, but as evidenced by Bolden’s statements, the agency has changed. NASA has become a “feel-good” bureaucracy, stuck on the idea of doing one-off stunts in space for public approval and a guaranteed institutional lifetime, paid for by the public. This attitude both inside and outside of the agency has lead to the demise of our national spaceflight capabilities. Stagnant entities reflexively dwell on past glory; dynamic ones build upon them to create something both significant and permanent.

Occasionally, I’m asked why I stay in the space business. I do so because I believe in the mission of space exploration and in the importance of moving humanity into the Solar System. Every now and then, an opportunity arises outside the boundaries of normal business to do something productive and create a lasting legacy – a time when the stars align and a leader refuses to follow the established rules or to unimaginatively subscribe to the conventional wisdom.

Currently, the “right stuff” manifests itself as a pattern of waiting for a propitious political opportunity and a few far-seeing people to seize the day and push through something that otherwise would be buried by “process.” In my opinion, the Vision for Space Exploration was such an opportunity – a path forward, achievable in stages, that would have created a legacy of space faring capability. The idea of actually doing something made the Vision a nonstarter to many within the agency – it challenged their worldview of process over product. They are content to merely manage an organization. The goal of leading America and the world into the Solar System has become a slogan in a strategic plan, an ever-fading banner over an office door.

Is any of this fixable? Perhaps. For now, the opportunity to strengthen the U.S. space program, an endeavor that has traditionally pushed technology development and stoked our economic engine, has been kicked aside. But by their very nature, new opportunities arise unbidden and unforeseen at irregular intervals. I wonder if we’ll do better next time.

Americans need to wonder.

Senate committee proposed National Space Policy shifts commercial and R&D to Heavy Lift by 2016

Nancy Atkinson

Universe Today

The Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee has unanimously approved legislation that would add a shuttle mission and jump start work on a heavy-lift rocket next year. The NASA Reauthorization Act effectively cancels the Constellation program, but directs NASA to begin work immediately on a new heavy-lift vehicle to be ready by 2016, along with a crew vehicle. The new legislation takes money away, however, from two main focuses on Obama's proposed budget: commercial space development and funding for innovation and breakthrough technologies.

Commercial space ventures would only get $1.6 billion for development in the next three years, as opposed to Obama's plan for $3.3 billion on commercial rocket companies between 2011 and 2013.

Obama had proposed $6 billion over five years for technology development whereas the new Senate bill funds advanced technologies at about $950 million over three years.

Both of these components of the are a big disappointment for those looking towards the future and not necessarily honing in on the next few years.

The plan, mainly spearheaded by Florida Senator Bill Nelson is said to be a compromise between Obama's plan and those in Congress who opposed it.

Read the article, HERE.

Congressional Support Grows For Heavy-Lift

Frank Morring, Jr. & Irene Klotz
Washington, Cape Canaveral
Aviation Week

A small groundswell is rising in Congress for a faster start on the heavy-lift launch vehicle President Obama says he wants, but it may be swamped by the backwash from growing irritation over NASA’s sluggish production of justification for its “game-changing” new approach.

A bipartisan gang of 62 House members wants Obama to initiate “the immediate development and production of a heavy-lift launch vehicle that, in conjunction with the Orion crew exploration vehicle, may be used for either lunar or deep-space exploration.”

Their June 22 letter to Obama, circulated by Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Va.), follows word from Sen. Bill Nelson (D-Fla.) that a new NASA authorization with at least some bipartisan support would include both a heavy-lifter and a crew exploration vehicle leveraging “the workforce, contracts, assets and capabilities of the shuttle, Ares I and Orion efforts.”

But, while some lawmakers appear ready to compromise with the White House on ending the Constellation program that has been funding Orion, the Ares I crew exploration vehicle and other follow-ons to the retiring space shuttle fleet, other space leaders are moving in completely different directions.

Read more HERE.

NASA budget gets a boost

Bart Jansen
Florida Today

WASHINGTON — A key House panel agreed Tuesday to accept President Barack Obama's proposed funding increase for NASA but without taking a position on changing the agency's course.

The House appropriations subcommittee governing NASA unanimously approved $19 billion for the fiscal year starting Oct. 1, a nearly $276 million increase from the current year.

But approval came with a requirement that the House and Senate science committees, which have strongly opposed Obama's budget, agree on a NASA policy before the money is spent.

"Unfortunately, a determination about the direction of the space program has been effectively put on hold for well over a year," said Rep. Alan Mollohan, D-W.Va., who heads the subcommittee.

Congress has been unable to approve a budget blueprint for spending this year, so committees are starting to decide on spending without knowing precise amounts. Lawmakers could take the rest of the year negotiating a dozen spending bills that govern NASA and the rest of the federal government.

The panel's top Republican, Rep. Frank Wolf of Virginia, said it might be unrealistic to think Congress will approve a NASA policy this election year.

"We need a strong American space program," Wolf said. "I hope we can find a compromise because we need it."

More HERE.

Malice, Mischief and Misconceptions

Paul D. Spudis
The Once & Future Moon
Smithsonian Air & Space

The space community has fractured since the disastrous roll out of NASA’s “new direction.” Preceding the administration’s budget announcement, endless delays and rampant speculation about administrators, rockets, and program design and direction kept people guessing. The current trench warfare is not a pretty sight, but it is not unexpected given the lack of a clear direction. Word has it that more detail will come out early next week, adding yet another layer to this growing space onion. The undirected, unfocused, unproductive spin cycle NASA (and the entire space community) has twirled around in for the last 18 months is instructive. It is real time, 20/20 insight on how the new direction will play out during the proposed five-year study hall being scheduled for NASA to find their “right stuff.”

The latest attempt to explain NASA’s new direction is an article published in Space.com by Clara Moskowitz. She tries to “correct” some alleged “misunderstandings” about the Obama administration’s new direction and budget for NASA. Her article quotes several space luminaries, who opine that the new path is simply “not understood” by a few petulant detractors who stubbornly refuse to accept Flexible Path as advertised. Responding to the criticism that the new path was conceived in secret by a small cabal without detailed thought, Moskowitz quotes my friend Jim Oberg as saying that the administration’s space proposal is “extremely similar” to a report issued by the International Astronautical Academy (IAA) and so (in effect) the new direction has been studied extensively by an “international astronautical group.”

"Many in the blogosphere continue to insist to those who know better that the new direction does include the Moon. By rejecting the Moon as a destination with such trite and unthinking casualness, the administration’s proposal has left those who understand the national economic, scientific and security implications of lunar return reeling."

The IAA report Oberg referred to was an outgrowth of NASA’s Decadal Planning Team activities in the early 2000’s and was being prepared for publication just as the 2004 Bush administration’s Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) was announced. There was no interaction between these two strategic plans. I re-examined the IAA report to see how closely it tallies with the Obama Administration’s proposed new direction for NASA and more significantly, how they both differ from the VSE (a direction endorsed by Congress and both political parties in 2005 and 2008).

I find that the general outline of the IAA report corresponds to the proposed new direction quite closely. Both the IAA report and the administration’s budget propose a “flexible path” approach for human journeys beyond low Earth orbit. Both plans outline a variety of possible destinations, including the Sun-Earth Lagrangian points, near-Earth asteroids, Phobos and Deimos (the moons of Mars), and finally the surface of Mars. The IAA report does not address transport to and from LEO, the starting point of these missions, but acknowledges that commercially procured transport of people and cargo is highly desirable.

A glaring difference between the IAA report and the administration’s budget proposal is that the IAA report specifically recognizes the Moon’s surface as a valid objective (as does the VSE). Many in the blogosphere continue to insist to those who know better that the new direction does include the Moon. By rejecting the Moon as a destination with such trite and unthinking casualness, the administration’s proposal has left those who understand the national economic, scientific and security implications of lunar return reeling. One could be forgiven for concluding that there is some mischief in how these reports are being conflated.

The stubborn high cost of exploration beyond Earth's Gravity Well can be overcome using lunar resources.

Oberg is correct in that there is commonality between the activities described in this report and the purported activities promised by the “new direction.” But the administration’s proposal did not go “through years of analysis, modification, and critiques by a worldwide team.” The IAA report retains the Moon as a destination and does not discard the national spaceflight system immediately in favor of a non-existent commercial transport system – it ignores the Earth to LEO segment completely. Neither the impact on our national aerospace industrial base and workforce, nor the bureaucratic effects of an unclear and indeterminate direction to NASA’s productivity were considered by the IAA report – or are considered by the administration’s new path, for that matter. The Obama administration has offered to assist the thousands of displaced aerospace workers affected by the new direction.

Let us examine the objectives of the IAA flexible path versus those of the VSE. The IAA report states that this plan is undertaken to “articulate a vision for the scientific exploration of space in the first half of the 21^st Century” and that “scientific objectives are used to determine the destinations for human explorers” (IAA report, Executive Summary, page 3). Moreover, the report states (as does the new direction) that although many destinations are envisioned, “the ultimate goal [is the] establishment of a human presence on Mars for science and exploration.” To this end, all technology development, infrastructure creation and scientific exploration are undertaken with the goal of humans on Mars as the ultimate end point.

In contrast, the VSE was undertaken to “to advance U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests through a robust space exploration program.” This included the “implementation of a sustained and affordable human and robotic program to explore the solar system and beyond, to extend human presence across the solar system, starting with a human return to the Moon by the year 2020 in preparation for human exploration of Mars and other destinations, to develop the innovative technologies, knowledge, and infrastructures both to explore and to support decisions about the destinations for human exploration, and promote international and commercial participation in exploration to further U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests.” The Moon is the necessary starting point for what is (in essence) the doorway into our entire Solar System.

The purpose of lunar return under the VSE is not to collect rocks or relive past space glories. Simply put, because we can’t take everything with us, humans must learn to use what we find in space to create new space faring capabilities, starting on the Moon. And our goals are not simply Mars, but everywhere – wherever human presence is needed or desired. Using the resources of the Moon (specifically, making consumables and propellant from lunar materials) enables routine access to all of space – not merely for science, but for economic and national security interests as well.

Oberg’s statement that the new direction for NASA received detailed study and thought, follows from his evaluation: 1) of the amount of study put into the IAA report; and 2) that the IAA report and the new path are equivalent. I do not deny the former, but strongly question the latter. Unlike the IAA report, flexible path as articulated in the new budget proposal not only eliminates the lunar surface as a destination (one chosen by the VSE specifically for its ability to enable new and greater space faring capability) but it also has a much narrower rationale: scientific study of Mars as opposed to the Vision’s objective of creating an extensible, reusable space faring infrastructure to conquer the budget-busting limitations imposed by our residence at the bottom of the gravity well of the Earth.

No understanding of Earth can be complete without a proper study of the Moon.

The administration’s proposed program for NASA indefinitely defers trips to destinations that have gravity wells. It is shortsighted and limited. The IAA report (and the new direction) focuses heavily on scientific aims while the VSE seeks to advance human exploration for “scientific, security and economic interests.” Architects of NASA’s new direction may not have understood or appreciated (or approved of) the objectives of the VSE, but those who read and understood the original reports and documents did. The VSE was about incrementally expanding the reach of people and machines by learning how to use the inexhaustible materials and energy of space, starting with the nearest, most accessible place beyond LEO that has what we need: the Moon. Breakthroughs and new understanding of the world and space around us rise to the fore and challenge us when we explore the unknown.

Civilizations thrive and advance when not in retreat. The administration’s chaotic proposal for NASA retreats from human space exploration. Many in the space community have serious doubts and concerns about this new direction. Labeling these doubts and concerns as “misconceptions” does not make the new direction valid nor change the reality that we are in danger of losing our capability as a space faring nation.

No way to run the space program

Mike Hollie
The Huntsville Times

President Obama's determination to overhaul the space program has become painfully clear to hundreds of households in Huntsville this week.

Some contractor employees working on the Constellation program have already been told to expect layoff notices and buyout offers, and others will probably join them this week and next. Up to 1,000 or so jobs are at stake at 21 local contractors employing 1,750 people on the Constellation program.

Nationwide, from 2,500 to 5,000 people working on Constellation will be dismissed during a tepid recovery from the nation's deepest recession in eight decades while space program supporters are trying to save their jobs.

Read the post, HERE.

Orion budget embargoed, 600 jobs cut

The first Lunar Test capsule for people since Project Apollo has just been welded into shape. This work finishes the structural framework of the pioneer Orion crew cabin – known as the Ground Test Article – or GTA, by a Lockheed Martin contractor team toiling away at the historic NASA-owned Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF) in New Orleans [NLSI/Ken Kremer].

Ken Kremer

SpaceRef.com

Lockheed Martin and other contractors working on NASA's endangered Constellation program now have no choice but to delay or halt forward progress on major aspects of the 'Return to the Moon' program and that will quickly cause numerous jobs cuts rippling across the US.

These actions are a direct result of new budget and contract guidance from NASA Administrator Charles Bolden with regard to contract termination liabilities for Project Constellation if the project is cancelled. This could effectively kill the moon program as desired by the Obama Administration, despite a Congressional legislative ban on changing or cancelling Constellation without the agreement of Congress.

"The impact of termination liability on the contract has necessitated a 20 percent reduction across the program within Lockheed Martin as well as our subcontractors and suppliers", says Cleon Lacefield, Lockheed Martin vice president and Orion program manager. Lacefield told me that "Orion procurements are being reduced to allow work to continue within the budget limitations and about 600 positions among the Lockheed Martin and subcontractor workforce are being moved off of the program to adjust staffing needs."

These cutbacks come directly on the heels of Lockheed Martin just completing the structural framework of the first Lunar Orion test capsule at NASA's Michoud Assembly Facility in New Orleans as reported in my illustrated Orion feature story on June 7 here.

Bolden outlined the job and budget issues in stark terms in a June 9 memo to the chairs of the key Congressional committees that have NASA oversight.

The issue is who is liable to pay for the costs of terminating NASA contracts; NASA or the contractors. Bolden states that according to the "Anti-Deficiency Act" the contractors must now set aside funds to cover the termination liability costs in case the contract is cancelled.

NASA estimates the termination liability costs this year to be almost $1 Billion and must be accounted for before the end of the fiscal year in September 2010.

Read the full article, HERE.

Pentagon industrial policy chief concerned U.S. space industry may lose edge

Space shuttle Atlantis' drag chute slows the vehicle as it rolls down Runway 33 at the Shuttle Landing Facility at NASA's Kennedy Space Center in Florida. Landing was at 8:48 a.m. EDT, completing the 12-day STS-132 mission to the International Space Station. The mission is the last planned for Atlantis, and third to the last planned for the Space Shuttle program [NASA/Sandra Joseph].

MDAA - Brett Lambert, Pentagon’s industrial policy chief, said that the U.S. space industry is getting less competitive against Asian and European firms, eventually threatening decades of U.S. primacy in this area. He argues that it is necessary to ease export controls on technologies to help the financing of the sector.

The dominance of the U.S. space industry is threatened by European and Asian firms, the Pentagon’s industrial policy chief said May 25.

“We’re at a tipping point with our space industry,” Brett Lambert said at a forum on the strength of the space industrial base hosted by the George C. Marshall Institute think tank. “We have for so long been the dominant player and the most technologically advanced player.”

European and Asian countries have developed their space industrial bases “not because they wanted to make those investments [but] because they didn’t have access to our technology,” he said. “As they get more capable, we will become less competitive.”

Read the full article, HERE.

"It's the Space Economy, Stupid!"

Paul D. Spudis
The Once and Future Moon
Smithsonian Air & Space Blogs

Those of us in favor of human lunar return have been called “dinosaurs” because, as it’s being told, we want to repeat what this nation already did 40 years ago. If that were our mission objective, such a characterization might be valid. But who really is the dinosaur?

At a recent Senate hearing, Norm Augustine told anecdotal stories in regard to lunar return, of how “our committee received many informal inputs, particularly from young people, questioning why we would have a space program whose centerpiece is something that was accomplished over a half-century earlier.” NASA Administrator Charles Bolden states publicly that trips to new (non-lunar) destinations is exciting, while there are already “six American flags on the Moon.” The President himself, referring to our efforts to return to the Moon, remarks with distain, “we’ve been there,” the implication being that only new destinations in space are sufficiently exciting for the American public.

The administration’s new direction calls on NASA’s manned space program to: 1) stop what they are doing; 2) transition into technology study groups with a window of five years for sketching out the hardware and roadmap that NASA will follow for visiting a variety of new and ever-more-distant destinations; and 3) as soon as a rocket is built, commence with the objective – a series of intermittent (though spectacular) space “firsts” (as they believe this formula is needed to recreate the emotional pull Apollo had on our nation) that will eventually lead to a human setting foot on something beyond LEO. The “new” direction requires that we launch everything we need on these voyages directly from the surface of the Earth. Afterwards, the small vehicle that returns the crew to Earth will be all that remains of the mission hardware. Then comes the next challenge: a more distant destination to keep a paying (but not going) public “engaged and excited.” The “new” template is nothing more than a very old one – keep the Roman public amused with circuses and gladiatorial shows.

In contrast, those of us who support the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) want to return to the Moon to use its abundant resources to incrementally create a sustainable, permanent human presence in cislunar space. We want reusable, extensible, maintainable and affordable systems in space. We want to unlock and harvest the enormous wealth of the Solar System for the benefit of all humanity. We want to do what has never before been done – extend our civilization into the universe. In place of one-off stunt missions, we want to create something of value – lasting and continuous access to space and its resources to expand our economy and create new wealth. Instead of repeating Apollo, the VSE is an engraved invitation that will encourage participation from the paying (and probably going) public. We want to build a real space economy.

The concept that our space program should excite people is a long-held faith in many space policy circles. Several annoying facts remain though, suggesting that regardless of their desire for public excitement, its existence (or lack thereof) does not historically track with our national space program. President Kennedy did not assemble a focus group or enlist a write-in campaign to gauge and prompt support for his call for a lunar landing program. In fact, he himself wanted to find another venue for Soviet-American competition, one that would produce more tangible and practical benefits, such as desalination of seawater.

Ever since it ended, NASA has doggedly tried to re-create the Apollo program. But the facts do not bear out their collective rosy memories of those days. Polls taken before and during the Apollo missions to the Moon, found, at best, a plurality of public opinion in support of the lunar landing effort. Many polls found a majority against the effort. Media interest was intense for the first landing (Would anyone expect otherwise?) but tailed off afterwards. During the totality of NASA’s existence, public support of the space program has hovered around 50-50 favor/oppose, regardless of what the agency was doing at the time. My conclusion from these results is that, in broad terms, people don’t really care that much about space; they do not oppose it, but they are not wildly enthusiastic about it either. Perhaps they can’t picture a time when they will move beyond their current role as mere spectators.

"Majority of Americans Say Space Program Costs Justified," Gallup/NBC

There is a belief in space circles that public excitement is a critical and driving factor in selecting goals and objectives in space. Threads on various space forums repeatedly argue for or against some path forward on the grounds that a certain program or effort will excite people. This belief is closely related to its corollary belief that excitement equals political support and hence, more funding for space efforts. There are two issues with this kind of thinking. First, regardless of the excitement factor, one cannot set goals and objectives that are technically impossible. For example, if the public decided tomorrow that only interstellar voyages were their hearts’ desire, we would not set that as a goal because we don’t know how to do it. More seriously, excitement does not necessarily correlate with value. We all buy and pay for many things that are exciting, such as watching or participating in sporting events, but after they are over, they are over. They may have some long-term value in improving our own health or satisfying a need to be entertained, but eventually, we turn away from them and go back to attending to the necessities of our daily lives. As adults, we need to spend time and money on practical matters as we plan and prepare for our futures.

In other words, it’s not excitement that we need from our space program, it’s value for the money spent. Many in the space community (and even many inside the agency itself) parrot the falsehood that lunar return under the VSE was all about repeating Apollo. In contrast to the trite “been there, done that” formulation of such misdirected thinking, the real purpose of return to the Moon under the VSE was to learn how to create sustainable human presence off the Earth, including learning how to harvest and use its material and energy resources. Such an objective has never been attempted. In fact, we’re not even certain that it can be done – that’s why it was given to an agency reputed to be our premier technical problem-solving agency – NASA.

So, who is the dinosaur here?

Feingold seeks early end to Constellation

Until national space policy is amended by Congress, perhaps with a budget for the next fiscal year which begins October 1, previously approved and funded work on the Constellation program will continue. While the administration has announced plans that include ending Constellation and terminating work underway for manned lunar exploration, Congress will ultimately determine the future of national space policy.

Leaders for Democrat Party majorities in both the U.S. House and Senate have no plans to begin work on next year's budget until after congressional elections on November 2.

Because the current fiscal year ends a month earlier, temporary spending plans will most likely be approved to bridge gaps in comprehensive budget authority. A "lame duck" Congress, after November's election, with it's present membership intact and still in session between the election and the inauguration of the next Congress in January, might be unable to agree on spending authority and priorities for all or part of the federal government.

Even if, after the election, the present Congress is able to agree on a FY 2011 spending plan, adjustments and even complete reversals of its best laid plans might be implemented almost immediately after the next Congress is seated in January. These scenarios are especially more likely if the make-up of the next Congress is dramatically different, having been changed by the voters in November.

Obviously, putting a permanent axe to Constellation and present work underway to return humans to the Moon (including the "Armstrong National Laboratory" as the American part of a permanent international station at the lunar south pole) would be harder for a new Congress to reverse if this work that is still in progress is terminated sooner rather than later.

All of which might explain why Senator Russ Feingold (D-Wisconsin) is seeking to short circuit any return to the Moon by quietly amending unrelated legislation. Proponents of Constellation are also running committee amendments to unrelated legislation in hopes of reiterating the present national space policy.

For more, Mark Whittington of Associated Content has more details, along with further speculation about Senator Feingold's motivations for amending Senate Bill 3356, HERE.

Apollo Astronauts: Future of Human Space Flight

United States Senate
Committee Commerce, Science and Transportation
Dr. Neil Armstrong, Captain Eugene Cernan & Hon. Norm Augustine
May 12, 2010

CSPAN.ORG Video Library - Witnesses talked about the future of human space flight in relation to President Obama's recent announcement of a new direction for NASA. Former Apollo astronauts criticized the plan as a "blueprint for a mission to nowhere" because it lacked a specific vision and proper review of the long-term NASA mission.

Harrison Schmitt details concerns about proposed Space Policy changes

Geologist, former U.S. Senator and the only professional scientist to visit the Moon, Dr. Harrison H. Schmitt spells out his specific concerns to Congress regarding proposed changes to American space policy.

The President announced a "bold approach for space exploration and discovery," to quote the White House. In considering his FY2011 budget proposals for NASA, Congress rightly should ask just how "bold" is this approach vs what America requires in the intense geopolitical environment of space.

In addition, Congress should ask for specifics as to why this approach would be better than the Constellation program already approved by Congress, and whether it truly "Advances America's commitment to human spaceflight and exploration of the solar system," to again quote the White House. Congress also should question if the proposals support the primary constitutional rationale for funding NASA, that is, as a contribution to "the common Defence."

The current United States space policy, twice approved by the Congress in response to President George W. Bush's FY2005 and subsequent budget requests, calls for focused technology development and mission formulations that would 1) enable a return to the Moon not later than 2020; 2) be consistent with future Mars exploration; 3) complete the construction of the International Space Station; and 4) replace the Space Shuttle with a new crewed vehicle not later than 2014.

The Constellation program's design would achieve these goals subject to the projected run-out funding for NASA in that original FY2005 budget.

Unfortunately, the Bush White House submitted annual budgets for FY2006-10 that funded Constellation $11 billion less than originally deemed necessary to maintain the proposed schedule. This includes the effects of an Office of Management and Budget error of about $3.8 billion in 2004 budgeting for the run-out cost of the Space Shuttle. Congress exacerbated this continued under-funding for Constellation through inflation-related cuts of about $1.5 billion in its 2006 and 2008 Continuing Resolutions.

In spite of these budgetary complications amounting to under-funding of some $12.5 billion over six years, and contrary to the Augustine-Crawley Commission's allegations, Constellation remains "executable" albeit with some delay relative to the original schedule. The Augustine-Crawley Commission did not look at the reality of the existing Constellation program and its previously approved funding, but constrained itself to the cumulative cuts of $28 billion for FY2010-20 submitted in the Obama budget for FY2010. Clearly, Constellation would not be "executable" with such drastic cuts to the original funding plan.

New funding of about $3 billion per year for the next five years would maintain the current schedule for Constellation and possibly remove dependency on Russia in 2014 for Space Station access (NASA's FY2010 budget of $18.3 billion is about 0.5 percent of total federal spending.). If this budgetary adherence to current space policy were undertaken, the United States could indefinitely maintain its dominant position as the world geopolitical and technical leader in space.

With this six-year long period of intense design and development already behind us, President Obama's budget proposals would stop Constellation and substitute the following policy elements:

1. A NASA budget increase of $6 billion over five years. These new dollars would be used largely to increase expenditures for space, Earth, and climate science. (This same $6 billion increase, if dedicated to Constellation, would give the U.S. its own Orion spacecraft and Ares launch vehicle for access to Space Station.)

2. A "commitment to decide in 2015" on a specific approach to a heavy-lift rocket. Such a launch vehicle would be required if future policy added flights to "lunar orbit, Lagrange Points, Asteroids, moons of Mars, and Mars." (With no commitment to any specific objective for new heavy-lift, this policy position is made to order to be abandoned. It contains the technically and philosophically ludicrous suggestions that Lagrange points could be fuel depots, without getting fuel from the Moon, and that a mission to an asteroid has greater historical value than a base on the Moon.)

3. Technology development and test to increase space capabilities and reduce costs. The objective would be to "establish the technological foundation for future crewed spacecraft for missions beyond Earth-orbit." (As with heavy-lift, the policy gives no focus for these technology efforts as valuable as they could be, particularly with the development of a domestically produced, large hydrocarbon fueled rocket engine like we had for Apollo. Claims of providing "more jobs for the country" are disingenuous, however, as many more thousands of jobs would disappear with the cancellation of Constellation and the retirement of the Space Shuttle.)

4. A "steady stream of precursor robotic exploration missions." (A steady stream of such missions has been underway for two decades so this is nothing new.)

5. Restructuring of Constellation with the Orion spacecraft downsized to an emergency escape vehicle for the Space Station. (Orion development has progressed to the point that this proposal amounts to its termination and the start of a new spacecraft program that will cost more that completing Orion. Contrary to White House claims, this logically does nothing to reduce dependence on Russia to carry Americans to the Space Station. Major additional costs would be incurred to fly the new Orion to the Station and replace it periodically.)

6. An increase in "astronaut days in space by 3500 over 10 years." (No obvious means of doing this exist based on available Russian Soyuz flights to the Space Station and current biomedical limits on crew exposure to the space environment.)

7. A "jumpstart" to non-NASA, "commercial space launch" capabilities for human space flight. (With no known business case that would justify referring to such a capability as a "commercial" venture that private investors would support, and no definition of the final level of requirements and specifications NASA ultimately would demand, this fully subsidized initiative amounts to another, probably under-funded program by government. It is not clear how much funding will be requested for this subsidy, but a total of about $3 billion of new money each year over ten years would keep Constellation on track for a 2014 availability of Orion and a 2020 return to the Moon.)

8. Placing the space program on a more ambitious trajectory. (Clearly, the President's proposals are not as ambitious as the Constellation return to the Moon/Mars exploration program. Rather, the President takes American human space flight out of the calculations of other nations.)

Although many inherent logical, technical, and implementation flaws in the Obama policy are evident, it is important to examine the consequences for the United States if the President's promises could be kept in their entirety:

1. The United States' human space flight capability will rapidly atrophy and then disappear by about 2020. With this atrophy would come the disappearance of the psychological geopolitical edge from which we have benefited immensely since World War II and particularly since Neil Armstrong stepped on the Moon.

2. China will control lunar resources for terrestrial energy and space flight as well as dominate the Settlement of the Moon and eventually Mars. China repeatedly expresses interest in harvesting helium-3 fusion fuel present in the Moon's surface materials. A lunar settlement, sustained by the by-products of helium-3 production, constitutes the most cost and politically effective means of gaining this critical future energy resource.

If the Moon comes under China's control, long-term geopolitical reality would be changed in the same way that the Middle East's control of oil dominates our current national security vulnerabilities.

3. Russia will control access to the International Space Station. Prices per astronaut visit to the Station, including the astronauts of our non-Russian partners, will escalate from the $50 million today to whatever the traffic will bear. After the Space Station must be abandoned due to aging, probably no later than 2025, any future station will be left to China and/or Russia to build, crew, and use.

4. Europe, Japan, and other nations with limited space capabilities will cut deals for space access with China and Russia. A clear loss of international interest in space and other partnerships with the United States will result.

5. Without a clear set of space objectives, NASA will be reduced to a Space Science Agency. Past strong technical and professional synergism with national security will disappear.

6. Subsidized human space flight development for national space projects will see cost escalation and schedule slips. If this nebulous alternative to traditional NASA contracting received adequate funding, including needed reserves, then this potential problem might disappear; but, since Apollo, that is too much to expect in modern federal budgeting. Inevitable cost and schedule problems will follow inadequate initial funding, unanticipated or unknown technical issues, requirement and specification creep, and progressive NASA intrusion into design and implementation. As taxpayer dollars will fund this effort, cost increases will be driven by the unfortunate and overly risk-adverse nature of mainstream media reporting, and political reactions by the Congress, White House, and NASA bureaucracy.

7. Inevitable shrinkage and loss of innovation of the aerospace and defense industrial base will occur. Combined with the Administration's and Congress' unconstitutional under-funding of advanced research, development, and testing for national security systems, the lack of funding and focus on specific space objectives will worsen this progressive weakening of our essential development and manufacturing foundations.

8. Engineering and science education and research will lose another major stimulus. The governmental and academic establishments continually underestimate the importance of national human space flight initiatives in stimulating academic education and research; but it is nonetheless still as real in the minds of young people today as it was after the launch of Sputnik in 1957.

In the light of these obvious adverse consequences even if all the President's promises are kept, and much worse if any are not, why would the President not just budget to properly fund and manage Constellation?

Compared to trillions of dollars of other spending he has asked for, this would have added a relative pittance. Would not President John Kennedy, or Presidents Eisenhower, Johnson, and Reagan, have moved forward in space rather than backward, given the global challenges we face?

The depth of the current Administration's antagonism toward the historical vision of America, as well as toward a preceding President, is unprecedented. The philosophical wedge driven between citizens and their government reaches deeper than any time since just before the Civil War. Our national future on Earth, as well as in the ocean of space, requires that this negative view of America, its people, and its future be overturned in upcoming elections.

Harrison H. Schmitt is a former United States Senator from New Mexico as well as a geologist and former Apollo Astronaut. He currently is an aerospace and private enterprise consultant and a member of the new Committee of Correspondence.

The tired, totally irrelevant "been there" thing

"We've been there before. Buzz has been there."

Paul D. Spudis
The Once and Future Moon
Smithsonian Air & Space Blogs

During a carefully staged appearance at Kennedy Space Center yesterday, President Barack Obama rolled out his plans for the U. S. space program. Although there weren’t many surprises (the White House Office of Science and Technology, under the direction of John P. Holdren, had released a fact sheet days earlier outlining details), one startling part of the speech was that we are abandoning the Moon as a goal. Though hinted at in several statements by people around the President, including NASA Administrator Charles Bolden and Apollo 11 Astronaut Buzz Aldrin, a path away from human return to the Moon is now officially the direction of Obama’s space policy.

Given the topic of this blog, it shouldn’t surprise many of you to learn that people are calling and writing me, asking for my reaction to the new policy. Although it wasn’t much of a surprise, it is disappointing to me, but not for the reasons you might suspect.

"Given the real and potential benefits of lunar return, the question is no longer “Why the Moon?” but “Why bypass the Moon?” I’m glad that “Buzz has been there” but that fact is irrelevant to either the value or the desirability of lunar return."

The speech detailed aspects of the administration’s new space budget, which will eliminate Project Constellation, contract with commercial entities for human transport to LEO, and spend money for development of new technology so as to “revolutionize” our access and capabilities in space. The Moon was finally mentioned near the end of the speech and I felt it would be fitting to use the President’s own words as the title for this post, and then give my views of the Moon’s place in the template of space exploration.

I’ve heard the “been there” line many times since 2004 when President George W. Bush announced the Vision for Space Exploration, so hearing it one more time was not a particularly jarring experience. But stop for a moment to consider exactly what President Obama said. Lunar return critics give many reasons to NOT go to the Moon: they think that it’s scientifically uninteresting, it doesn’t contain what we need, it will turn into a money sink (preventing voyages to many other destinations in space – perhaps one on their list), that there are more pressing needs here on Earth, and I’m sure others that I haven’t yet heard. But this new space policy rationale is unique and carries with it different and significant implications for our nation’s exploration of space.

We have now added a new requirement for U.S. space missions – we must go to a place never before visited by humans. Of course, some will argue that such a concept is implicit in the word “exploration” but until recently, exploration encompassed a much wider concept where exploration was followed by exploitation and settlement by many people from many walks of life using many different skills toward a myriad of goals. I wonder if supporters of this new space policy have stopped to consider the implications of the “not been there” requirement. The new meaning of exploration contains within it the seeds of its own termination: after you’ve touched the surface, planted a flag, and collected some rocks or deployed an instrument, that destination is “done.” Or does such a formulation apply only to the Moon?

One of the biggest criticisms hurled at Project Constellation is that it is largely a grandiose repeat of the Apollo explorations of the Moon undertaken over 40 years ago. Certainly, as had been outlined by NASA, lunar return consisted of sortie missions that landed crews all over the Moon to do local field exploration. Such a mission template is indeed Apollo writ large. But that is not and was never the intent of lunar return under the Vision for Space Exploration which is now under assault. Constellation was largely NASA’s rocket development program, while the Vision for Space Exploration was strategic direction outlining a sustainable lunar return, whereby we would bootstrap our way “beyond” by learning how to use the resources of the Moon and other bodies.

So let me respond to the President’s new plan by reminding the readers of this column why the Moon is our goal and of its significance and value to space exploration.

It’s close. Unlike virtually all other destinations in space beyond low Earth orbit, the Moon is near in time (a few days) and energy (a few hundreds of meters per second.) In addition to its proximity, because the Moon orbits the Earth, it is the most accessible target beyond LEO, having nearly continuous windows for arrival and departure. This routine accessibility is in contrast to all of the planets and asteroids, which orbit the Sun and have narrow, irregular windows of access that depend on their alignment with respect to the Earth. The closeness and accessibility of the Moon permit modes of operation not possible with other space destinations, such as a near real-time (less than 3 seconds) communication link.

"The new meaning of exploration contains within it the seeds of its own termination: after you’ve touched the surface, planted a flag, and collected some rocks or deployed an instrument, that destination is “done.” Or does such a formulation apply only to the Moon?"

Robotic machines can be teleoperated directly from Earth, permitting hard, dangerous manual labor on the Moon to be done by machines controlled by humans either on the Moon or from Earth. The closeness of the Moon also permits easy and continuous abort capability, certainly something we do not want to take advantage of, but comforting to know is handy until we have more robust and reliable space subsystems. If you don’t believe this is important, ask the crew of Apollo 13.

It’s interesting. The Moon offers scientific value that is unique within the family of objects in the Solar System. The Moon has no atmosphere or global magnetic field so plasmas and streams of energetic particles impinge directly on its surface, embedding themselves onto the lunar dust grains. Thus:

The Moon contains a detailed record of the Sun’s output through geological time (over at least the last 4 billion years). The value of such a record is that the Sun is the principal driver of Earth’s climate and by recovering that detailed record (unavailable anywhere on the Earth), it can help us understand the details of solar output, both its cycles and singular events, throughout the history of the Solar System. Additionally, because of the Moon’s ancient surface and proximity to the Earth, it retains a record of the impact bombardment history of both bodies. We now know that the collision of large bodies has drastic effects on the geological and biological evolution of the Earth and occur at quasi-regular intervals. Because our very survival depends on understanding the nature and history of these events as a basis for the prediction of future events, the record on the lunar surface is critical to our understanding.

A radio telescope on the far side of the Moon can “see” into deep space from the only platform in the Solar System that is permanently free from Earth’s radio noise. The Moon is a unique, rich and valuable scientific asset.

It’s useful. In my opinion, this is the most important and pressing argument for making the Moon our first destination beyond LEO. Because of the detailed exploration of the Moon undertaken during the last 20 years, we have a very different understanding of its properties than we did immediately following Apollo. Specifically, the Moon has accessible and immediately usable resources of both energy and materials in its polar regions, something about which we were almost completely ignorant only a few years ago. For energy, both poles offer benign surface temperatures and near-permanent sunlight, as the lunar spin axis obliquity is nearly perpendicular to the plane of Earth’s orbit around the Sun. This relation solves one of the most difficult issues of lunar habitation – the 14-day long lunar night, which challenges the design of thermal and power systems. In addition, once thought to be a barren desert, we have recently found that the Moon contains abundant and accessible deposits of water, in a variety of forms and concentrations. There is enough water on the Moon to bootstrap a permanent, sustained human presence there. Water is the most important substance to find and use in space; not only does it support human life by its consumption and provision of breathable oxygen, in its form as cryogenic liquid oxygen and hydrogen, it is the most powerful chemical rocket propellant known. A transportation system that can routinely access the lunar surface to refuel, can also access all of cislunar space, where all of our national strategic and commercial (and much of our scientific) assets reside (many satellites reside above LEO and are inaccessible for repair). Such a system would truly and fundamentally change the paradigm of spaceflight and can be realized through the mining and processing of the water ice deposits near the poles of the Moon. Space exploration should be a driving force in our economy not merely a playground for scientists or a venue for public entertainment.

Given the real and potential benefits of lunar return, the question is no longer “Why the Moon?” but “Why bypass the Moon?” I’m glad that “Buzz has been there” but that fact is irrelevant to either the value or the desirability of lunar return. By proposing to eliminate the Moon as a destination, the President has fundamentally altered the societal value of the space program in a significant and qualitatively different way.

If our new space program is to be made into a simple instrument of public spectacle (“cheap thrills” and “colossal feats,” as variously reported by news columnists) with each new mission requiring a “series of ‘firsts’ to engage and excite the public”, it will no longer have any more real long term benefit to our national security and wealth than did the bread and circus shows that heralded the demise of ancient Rome. Yes, there were and will be some exciting spectacles. And when such events are finished, people turn away and go home – none the wiser, none the richer, and none the better off. We won’t be staying at any destination long enough to fully characterize it and use what it has to offer.

Is this the kind of space exploration we want?

The seeds of the termination of our national space program were planted yesterday in Florida.

Dr. Paul D. Spudis is a Senior Staff Scientist at the Lunar and Planetary Institute in Houston. His opinions are his own and do not reflect the views of his employer or the Smithsonian Institution.

Cernan & Lovell: Retreat from Moon 'disasterous'

Gene Cernan (Apollo 10 & Apollo 17) and Jim Lovell (Apollo 8 & Apollo 13); the veteran Gemini and Apollo astronauts decried the proposed cancellation of the Constellation program in widely circulated news reports, last week.

Gene Cernan and Jim Lovell created more buzz about the Moon this past week than the latest rumor about the next release in the 'Twilight' saga. Their dire warnings to the Royal Society in London concerning the president's proposed cancellation of NASA's Constellation program continues to be picked up by every news organ on the planet. It's a testimony to the respect, even reverence, still held for the only men to travel to the vicinity of the Moon twice during the Apollo era (1968-1972).

As lunar module pilot on Apollo 10, a dress rehearsal two months before Apollo 11, Cernan traveled to within 15 kilometers of the Sea of Tranquility and four years officially spent more time on the lunar surface than any single individual, becoming the last man to walk on the Moon in command of Apollo 17 in 1972.

Similarly situated in the second seat of Apollo 8, traveling with Frank Borman and Bill Anders, dazzled the world in December 1968 when they became the first humans to travel beyond Earth orbit, circling the Moon ten times before returning to Earth in December 1968.

Lovell's dream of walking on the Moon, in command of Apollo 13, was dashed forty years ago next month when a service module tank explosion collapsed the command module's life support system. Fortunately, an ingenious and unplanned use of the resources of the Apollo 13 lunar module's engine and life support system returned the crew back to Earth.

Yet another generation was afforded the hair-raising experience of the near-disaster of the aborted Apollo 13 Moon landing and its single swing behind the Moon when the motion picture "Apollo 13" (starring Tom Hanks as Lovell) premiered in June 1995.

Though it was already a more obscure but oft-repeated phrase, Lovell's initial report of the on-board explosion has never been a more popular part of our heritage of language.

"Houston, we have a problem"is now firmly situated as the absolute model for a no-frills, understated report of disaster. Perhaps this is the reason why when Lovell called something 'catastrophic,' last week in London it drew attention, and even a second glance; something rare in a world even more filled with noise than during the tumultuous Apollo era.

Mark Whittington of Associated Content followed-up on the original BBC interview, attendant to Lovell and Cernan (together with Dr. Armstrong) and their private meeting with the Royal Society.

"Personally, I think it will have catastrophic consequences in our ability to explore space and the spin-offs we get from space technology," Lovell said. "They haven't thought through the consequences."

Eugene Cernan, part of the 1972 Apollo 17 mission, said the U.S. has a responsibility to lead the world in space exploration and technology and that he hopes people will be back on the moon "sooner than later."

"I'm quite disappointed that I'm still the last man on the moon. I thought we'd have gone back long before now," Cernan said. "But I am absolutely committed to the fact that we will go back at some time.""I think America has a responsibility to maintain its leadership in technology and its moral leadership... to seek knowledge. Curiosity's the essence of human existence."

President Obama's decision to cancel the Constellation return to the Moon program has run into a firestorm of criticism which seems to have caught the Administration by surprise. President Obama has scheduled a "Space Summit" in Florida next month to try to explain his reasons for canceling Constellation.

The problem is that not only have the Apollo missions to the Moon become part of the American story, a source of pride and proof of American exceptionalism, the fact that Americans have not been back to the Moon in almost forty years has become a silent source of shame.

Though any cancellation of the Constellation program is often reported as a done-deal, NASA and American space policy are officially unchanged, and work continues, even on the Ares 1. NASA is a "creature of Congress," and President Obama's "decision' to permanently postpone travel to the lunar surface awaits a change approved or rejected by Congress.

Though Constellation was originally a pay-as-you-go proposition, as a part of the Vision for Space Exploration set out by President George W. Bush in 2004, the proposed elimination of Constellation immediately polarized an Internet-active "space community," along with interests in regions and industrial sectors.