China as emerging space power, U.S. opportunity

China's new Long March heavy-lift first stage engine passes 200-second test (HT: Jack Kennedy, Spaceports). The test took place in an valley 50 kilometres from Xi'an, capital of Shaan'xi province, in northwest China.The new engines will be used with the Long March-5 rocket beginning in 2014.

Frank Klotz
The Atlantic

"The U.S. could have much to gain by cooperating with China's growing space program."

Liu Yang, China's first female in Space,
waves during a departure ceremony at
Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center [Reuters].

Commentators often refer to China as an "emerging space power." This characterization understates China's current space capabilities. China has in many respects already reached the top tier of spacefaring nations--with profound implications not only for America's own interests in space, but also for the much-touted "pivot" to the Asia-Pacific region.

While initially starting well behind the two original space powers, China has slowly but steadily added accomplishments to its space portfolio. In 2011, it conducted nineteen space launches--twelve less than Russia that year but one more than the United States. It has manufactured satellites for domestic use and marketed satellites for export, with customers in Southeast Asia, Africa and South America. Chinese spacecraft already have orbited the moon, and Beijing has signaled its intention to land an unmanned probe and possibly even astronauts on the lunar surface.

In late June, China's space endeavors captured headlines across the world when three Chinese astronauts manually docked their Shenzhou-9 spacecraft with the orbiting Tiangong-1 module. In doing so, China became only the third nation besides the United States and Russia to accomplish this complex maneuver. It also demonstrated a capability it will need to one day assemble and operate a permanently manned space station.

Two optional configurations for China's Long-March V heavy-lift, now
in development HT: Craig Covault, AmericaSpace [CNSA].

Western experts note that a fundamental purpose of the Chinese space program is to bolster the image of China--and the ruling Chinese Communist Party--both at home and abroad. It also aims to spur the development of Chinese science and technology.

Chinese activities in space also have an undeniable military purpose. By their very nature, certain space-related capabilities--launch, earth observation, long-distance communications, precision navigation--can serve both civil and military objectives. In China's case, the overlap is substantial. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) in fact directs major elements of the nation's space program, including manned spaceflight.

As Dean Cheng of the Heritage Foundation has noted, Chinese military writings emphasize the roles space systems can play in supporting air, land and sea operations. These include finding and attacking American forces operating in the Asia-Pacific region. With this end clearly in mind, the PLA is expanding its current constellations of reconnaissance, navigation, meteorological and communications satellites.

Likewise, Chinese strategists understand the growing extent to which the United States and its allies depend upon space-related capabilities in conducting their own military operations. Accordingly, China appears intent on developing capabilities to disrupt an adversary's ability to use space systems, either by attacking satellites directly or by interfering with the ground stations and the communications nodes essential to satellite operations.

For example, in 2007, China conducted a test of a direct-ascent antisatellite interceptor that literally blasted an aging Chinese weather satellite into thousands of metal shards. In the process, it created a cloud of debris that will pose a serious hazard to satellites flying in low-earth orbit for many years to come.

Read the full article, HERE.

Frank Klotz is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC, as well as the former commander of Air Force Global Strike Command and the former vice commander of Air Force Space Command. The opinions expressed are his own.

Schematic of Earth-orbit/Lunar-orbit rendezvous plan for China's eventual lunar landing mission is similar to that of the Soviet Union in the 1960's and (in part) the U.S. Constellation scenario prior to the recent cancellation of the Antares lander. Click to enlarge. HT: Craig Covault, AmericaSpace [CNSA].

NASA's Space Launch System Passes Major Agency Review, Moves to Preliminary Design

Artist rendering of the various configurations of NASA's Space Launch System (SLS) together with a quick comparison with the Saturn V (1967-1972) [NASA].

The rocket that will launch humans farther into space than ever before passed a major NASA review Wednesday. The Space Launch System (SLS) Program completed a combined System Requirements Review and System Definition Review, which set requirements of the overall launch vehicle system. SLS now moves ahead to its preliminary design phase.

The SLS will launch NASA's Orion spacecraft and other payloads, and provide an entirely new capability for human exploration beyond low Earth orbit.

These NASA reviews set technical, performance, cost and schedule requirements to provide on-time development of the heavy-lift rocket. As part of the process, an independent review board comprised of technical experts from across NASA evaluated SLS Program documents describing vehicle specifications, budget and schedule. The board confirmed SLS is ready to move from concept development to preliminary design. 

Read the NASA announcement, HERE.

The Tale of Falcon 1

Liftoff of Flight 4 of the Falcon 1 from Kwajalein, September 28, 2008. SpaceX achieved an elliptical orbit (621 x 643 km) at 9.3° inclination and carried into orbit a dummy payload at 165 kg designed and built for the mission [SpaceX].

Paul D. Spudis
The Once and Future Moon
Smithsonian Air & Space
  

Elon Musk founded Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX) in 2002.  Its stated business objective was the development of launch services for a fraction of the cost of the then-available commercial launch providers – to the greatest extent practicable, they would create reusable pieces of its launch system, thereby greatly lowering the cost of space access.  Toward that end, SpaceX sponsored the development of its own launch vehicle and engines, using a vertically integrated business model in which SpaceX would design, fabricate, prepare and operate a launch system.

Alan Boyle’s recent review of commercial efforts to supply the International Space Station naturally included coverage of the successful flight of SpaceX’s Falcon 9 rocket and Dragon’s delivery demonstration.  The article focused on the way commercial space is financed, specifically how NASA is sponsoring the development of some of these capabilities.  This financial arrangement is the basis for a point repeatedly voiced by critics of the heralded vision of “New Space” replacing “government” space – a company like SpaceX is not actually commercial in the traditional free market sense, but simply another government-funded contractor using a different procurement model.

Falcon 1 was the first rocket developed by SpaceX.  It is a two-stage launch vehicle capable of putting a metric ton (1000 kg.) into low Earth orbit.  Falcon 1 uses a single Merlin, a SpaceX-developed, LOX-kerosene rocket engine producing ~570,000 newtons of thrust (for comparison, a single Shuttle main engine burns LOX-hydrogen fuel and produces about 2,300,000 newtons of thrust).  The Falcon 1 was designed to put relatively small satellites into low earth orbit.  With such payload capacity, it is also capable of sending 100-200 kg microsats beyond LEO, into cislunar space.

Much of the private start-up capital for SpaceX was used to develop the Falcon 1.  They also received some government funding from other than NASA.  The Department of Defense (DOD) had need for reliable, quick, and cheap space access for small payloads.  To that end, SpaceX received funding from several DOD entities, including several million dollars from the U.S. Air Force under a program to develop launch capability for DARPA (a defense research agency).  Space X was given access to and the use of DOD launch facilities at the Reagan Test Site (formerly Kwajalein Missile Range) in the Marshall Islands.

The early days of Falcon 1 development were not pretty.  The first launch failed after 25 seconds of flight.  The second flight successfully launched and staged, but did not reach orbit.  After the third attempt at flight failed during staging, a review board looked in detail at SpaceX’s launch processing stream and made recommendations for some significant changes.  The next launch was successful in putting a dummy payload into orbit.  In July 2009, six years after Falcon 1 development had begun, SpaceX achieved its first (and so far, only) commercial space success with the launch and orbit of the Malaysian RazakSAT imaging satellite on a Falcon 1 launch.

Typically when a space company finally achieves a long-sought success, it moves rapidly to exploit the new vehicle’s operational status and begins to aggressively market and sell its new launch service.  However, no Falcon 1 launch has occurred since the success of RazakSAT.  A visit to the SpaceX web site describes the Falcon 1 vehicle, but at the bottom of the page it states that a Falcon 1 launch is no longer available for purchase.  Instead, small, one-ton class payloads will be accommodated in the future through “piggyback” rides on the new, Falcon 9 medium-class launch vehicle.

For a company to spend six years and start up money developing a needed launch system, only to abandon it just as success and profit is at hand, is difficult to sort through.  One could be forgiven for imagining that the development of the Falcon 1 as a commercial launch system was never intended but rather a pretext to flight qualify the pieces (specifically the Merlin 1 engine) used in the nine-engine cluster that powers the Falcon 9 launcher.  Interestingly, others have noted that the now-cancelled NASA Constellation Ares I launch vehicle (“The Stick”), purportedly designed to launch the new Orion spacecraft to LEO, likewise appeared to be more of a development effort than a flight project, in that its various pieces (e.g., cryogenic upper stage, five-segment SRB) were all needed to build the large Ares V heavy lift rocket.

Meanwhile, customers in need of low-cost options for launching small payloads are out of luck.  Falcon 9 has yet to launch an ounce of commercial payload and Falcon 1 is not for sale.  Of course, one can launch small satellites using Orbital’s Taurus launch vehicle, but its ~$50-70 M cost and recent record of unreliability (e.g., the Glory satellite launch failure) engender neither comfort nor confidence.  More significantly, after investing in the R&D effort of a new, unproven company that was offering a low cost, small launch vehicle, SpaceX’s original DoD customers, banking on the creation of a quick, inexpensive capability to launch small satellites, saw their support of Falcon 1 go by the board.  It appears that SpaceX dropped their initial operational vehicle for the promotion and promise of far more ambitious and distant goals.

Artist's rendering of the Falcon 9 heavy-lift launch
plans for which are expected in 2013 [SpaceX].

That template seems to work for them – NASA has “invested” more than $500 million in the Falcon 9 over the last five years.  Now, SpaceX holds court to advance their founder’s Mars fantasies and plans for a Falcon “heavy” launch vehicle – designed and marketed as sending very large payloads into space, at unbelievably low prices.  (As an aside, I thought that a New Space article of faith is that heavy lift is a boondoggle and that fuel depots are the way to go beyond LEO.)

When New Space advocates characterize old NASA contractors, legacy launch companies and politicians with NASA centers in their districts as “pigs at the trough of government funding,” they’d be wise to watch out for a “pig” donning falcon feathers.  Debate, like competition is good and helpful but only useful when advocates honestly pitch their abilities, services, products and intentions.   Money is an important consideration, however our nation’s ability to compete in the arena of space must be the overriding concern.  In light of the current situation, that ability is slipping further and further away.  We need to honestly assess what we’re buying before nothing remains of our decades long investment and leadership role in space.

Originally published at his Smithsonian Air & Space blog The Once and Future Moon, Dr. Spudis is a senior staff scientist at the Lunar and Planetary Institute. The opinions expressed are those of the author and are better informed than average. 

Delta IV second stage chosen for Orion tests

Delta IV upper stage utilized on a variety of
configurations [NASA/USAF].

Todd Halverson
Florida Today

NASA intends to use a modified Delta IV second stage to launch Orion spacecraft on an unmanned test flight in 2017 and then a human expedition to lunar orbit four years later.

The Boeing upper stage is “the only means available to support the immediate in-space propulsion needs” for the excursions, NASA said in a procurement notice issued early this month.

The missions both are to be launched from complex 39B at Kennedy Space Center on early versions of NASA’s new heavy-lift Space Launch System.

The second stage for the first flight must be delivered to KSC no later than the fourth quarter of 2016, the notice said. The fourth quarter of 2020 is the deadline for delivery of the upper stage for the second mission.

NASA performed an internal market study of in-space propulsion systems available in the U.S., Europe and Japan, the notice said. From that research, NASA determined that the Delta IV upper stage “is the only known in-space stage requiring relatively minor modifications” to meet mission requirements as well as the launch schedule, the notice said.

Moreover, NASA said no other in-space propulsion system – “either existing with flight proven performance, or planned” – could be upgraded to fly astronauts with “relatively minor modifications.”

A single Pratt & Whitney RL-10B2 engine powers the Delta IV second stage. The engine runs on supercold liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen.

The RL-10 was the first liquid hydrogen rocket engine built in the United States and has been flying for 50 years. Versions of it still power Atlas V and Delta IV upper stages.

Read the full article HERE.

Background from Spaceflight NOW

Rocket research boosts China's lunar mission

China's heavy-lift Long-March V exhibit, August 2010.
Proposed booster would be more powerful.
[www.Chine-Defense-Mashup.com].

Xin Dingding
China Daily

BEIJING - Scientists have finished preliminary research into a heavy-thrust carrier rocket that could help China send men to the moon and fly to deep space in the future, said Liang Xiaohong, vice-president of the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology.

"If approved (by the government), the heavy-thrust carrier rocket will be able to meet the demands of any proposed Chinese mission in space," said Liang, who is also a member of the National Committee of the 11th Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

After about two years of research and argument, scientists agreed that China's future heavy-lift carrier rocket should have a lift-off thrust of 3,000 metric tons and be able to send a payload of 100 metric tons into the low-Earth orbit. Liang declined to give more details.

The behemoth launcher will be much more powerful than China's current largest launcher, Long March 5, which is designed with a lift-off thrust of 1,000 metric tons that enables it to send a maximum payload of 25 metric tons to the low-Earth orbit and a payload of 10 tons to the higher geostationary orbit.

"China lagged more than 10 years behind the United States, Russia and Europe in the development of large-thrust launchers, and should not repeat the mistake in heavy-thrust launchers," he said. The academy proposed in 1986 to develop a large-thrust launcher, but it was not approved until 2006. Now, major space powers are pulling their resources together to develop new heavy-thrust rockets.

According to media reports, NASA in September unveiled the design of a new rocket that could lift up to 130 metric tons. Its retired Saturn V rocket that powered the Apollo moon exploration program could lift 120 metric tons. Russia is also developing a heavy-thrust launcher that could lift up to 110 metric tons.

"China should not miss out on these developments again, given its current economic and scientific strength," he said. China is also researching how to use the boosters and the first two stages of a launch vehicle repeatedly, which could help reduce the launch cost, he said.

China's Long March rockets currently in service are the Long March 1 to 4 series. Aiming to boost capacity, the country is developing a new family of launch vehicles, including Long March 5 to 7.

Liang said that so far, China has made key technological progress in developing a Long March 5 large-thrust carrier rocket. It is hoped that the new generation of rocket will make its maiden flight in 2014.

Engineers and scientists have succeeded in developing the first hydrogen box that will be used to store fuel for the Long March 5 rocket. He said production of the rocket's key parts will be completed this year.

The Long March 5 rocket will more than triple Chinese rockets' carrying capacity in outer space. Using non-toxic and pollution-free propellant, the 60-meter-long rocket will be equipped with four propellers, with each measuring 3.35 meters in diameter, he said.

Meanwhile, the Long March 7 carrier rocket, with a launch capacity of 13.5 metric tons in low-Earth orbit and 5.5 metric tons in sun-synchronous orbit, is expected to take its maiden flight within five years.

"The Long March 7 will be able to carry cargo spacecraft for China's future space station program and fulfill the long-term needs of the country's manned space program," he said.

China plans to establish its own space lab around 2016 and a manned space station around 2020, the Xinhua News Agency reported. Liang said he expects the new generation of carrier rockets to phase out some of China's in-service rockets and handle the bulk of China's space missions in five years.

HEFT, Lies and Videotape

Cost and Schedule of Shuttle sidemount compared with HEFT alternatives. This is the only HLV option that meets all legal requirements and fits within the budget and schedule assumptions of HEFT. Data derived from SSP Study NSTS 60583, dated June 8, 2010.

Paul D. Spudis
The Once & Future Moon
Smithsonian Air & Space

A real comedy of errors and misunderstandings collided this week between the new NASA Authorization Act of 2010 and the agency’s Human Exploration Framework Team (HEFT) Congressionally mandated 90-day report (their initial findings on how to implement agency direction). Thought flush with the usual beautiful graphics and platitudes, the report’s bottom line is that under the existing budget and schedule, the agency cannot make the new heavy lift launch vehicle specified in the new authorization bill. In other words, you can’t get there from here. Can’t be done. Period.

Reading through the new report is an exercise in déjà vu for space policy geeks. It reads very much like the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) of 2005. No big surprise, when one realizes that many of the people who wrote that report are involved in the new one. But more than that, the sense of a previous life stems from the rocket design that has resulted from this effort. It looks remarkably similar to the rocket that resulted from the previous effort, the late and not-so-lamented Ares family of heavy lifters. As you may recall, a key conclusion of the oft-cited Augustine Committee report was that the existing program of record (Project Constellation, a.k.a. Ares rocket) was unaffordable without infusions of significant quantities of new money.

Did NASA get a big infusion of cash? No. So no one should be surprised that the same people, working under the same assumptions within the same agency and technology base as the Project Constellation people would reach the same conclusions. In fact, most were not surprised. But apparently, many in the United States Senate did expect a different answer. Or did they?

We now enter the political Hall of Mirrors in which what people say they want isn’t necessarily related to what they really want or don’t want. Let us see if we can chart a path through the maze of motives, desires and statements to fully understand exactly what’s going on. Please stay with me on this until the end; I will try to make things clear.

Seven years ago, we had the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE), a statement of strategic direction in space. The VSE called for returning Shuttle to flight after the Columbia accident, completing construction of the ISS, the building of a new space transportation system, a return to the Moon (“with the goal of living and working there for increasing periods of time”) and finally, human missions to Mars and “other destinations.” After the VSE was announced, NASA “implemented” it by completing steps 1 and 2. Step 3 was started, outlining an architecture and design for a new human spacecraft and new launch vehicles (the ESAS). We never progressed beyond that, although many departments, universities and international partners dug in and began conducting studies of work and instruments needed to live on the Moon.

It is a fool’s errand to design architectures and new space vehicles if you do not know what your mission is. You can design and build a space system without an objective but as it must satisfy many different purposes, it tends to not satisfy any of them particularly well. From the beginning, NASA leadership didn’t acquaint itself with why they were tasked with lunar return, even though the VSE founding documents are quite clear on the purpose and activities associated with lunar return. Because of this strategic confusion, it was largely assumed by many that we would do on the Moon what we did 40 years ago – explore, collect samples, and leave as soon as possible (that last activity being particularly favored within the agency). To accommodate this activity, the Ares launch vehicles were designed to conduct a lunar mission with two launches – the Ares I, which would put the crew vehicle in low Earth orbit and the Ares V, which carried all the other pieces. Additionally, NASA never lost sight of its desire for Mars, so Ares V was sized at a payload capacity of 160 tons, overkill for a lunar mission but thought to be the right number for a human Mars mission, staged completely from the surface of the Earth (whether that’s true is another story).

As Ares rocket development costs rose, other pieces of the lunar return architecture were discarded. Eventually, we had a large rocket-building program but its purpose had become diffuse and nebulous (in 2009, the acting Administrator of NASA told Congress in testimony that he did not know what going to the Moon meant).

Curiously, the new NASA Authorization Act of 2010 was remarkably specific about the requirements of a new heavy lift vehicle the agency had been directed to build. It was to use Shuttle hardware to “the extent practicable” and initially carry 70-100 tons but designed such that it could be stretched to a lift capacity of 130 tons. Where did these numbers come from? It’s not clear, but here’s an interesting coincidence: 130 tons was the lift the capacity of the old Saturn V (118,000 kg = 260,000 pounds = 130 tons). NASA has interpreted the new Congressional language as meaning metric tons (2200 lbs) but the simple language of the law says “tons” (1 ton = 2000 lbs). One might suspect that the calculus was that heavy lift in days of old (Saturn V) meant 130 tons, so that’s what “heavy lift” should be.

In the absence of any specific mission, the payload capacity of your launch vehicle is entirely academic. But this “requirement” has had some serious ramifications. Last summer, a study group at Johnson Space Center released a report (Preliminary Report Regarding NASA’s Space Launch System and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle, Pursuant to Section 309 of the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-267), SSP Study NSTS 60583, dated June 8, 2010) showing how a heavy lift vehicle could be built and flown under the then-current run out budget (any new budget for NASA is pure guesswork at this stage). It resurrects an old concept of replacing the Shuttle orbiter on the existing stack with a payload fairing and engine pod. This configuration, called Shuttle Side-Mount (updated from the old “Shuttle-C” concept) was not considered by the HEFT study team, but meets the specific language of the new authorization. The advantage of SSM is that, as it is a minimal modification of the existing stack, it uses all of NASA’s existing launch and processing infrastructure – launch pads, mobile crawlers, scaffolding in the VAB and fabrication facilities in Michoud and Utah. SSM initially carries about 80 metric tons (70 (63.3 metric) to 100 (90.7 metric) tons) and can be stretched to meet the 130 ton (118 metric tons) legal requirement with minimal modification (for example, adding 5-segment (instead of 4-segment) Solid Rocket Boosters, 4 Shuttle Main Engines, extended External Tank). So in fact, SSM meets all the technical, budgetary, safety and schedule requirements set out in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010.

So as Oliver Hardy would say, here’s another fine mess we’ve gotten ourselves into. NASA creates an unaffordable architecture (ESAS) to implement the VSE. The response by the new administration is to cancel the VSE and replace it with promises of more distant goals at some nebulous time in the far future. Congress directs the agency to build an HLV anyway, but the vehicle has no mission, so they pull out the specs of the last HLV America flew. NASA responds by saying they can’t do it on the money and schedule specified, even though they themselves have in hand a report that shows how it can be done. Moreover, the agency still claims it doesn’t know why anyone would want to go to the Moon, despite having been shown repeatedly that what we do there will create new space faring capability.

You just gotta love this business.

Congress as rocket designers

Creature of Congress: The Ares V heavy-lift, last seen in 2007 and as part of the Constellation program. Thrown out with the bath water in abandoning Constellation in FY2011, does the congressional consensus for NASA now call for the same vehicle, with no Altair to fly, or is Congress looking for something similar to the Saturn 1-B? [NASA]

Jeff Foust
Space Politics

While the Senate version of the NASA authorization bill, S. 3729, made it clear that the heavy-lift launch vehicle it calls for, the Space Launch System, should be developed by “extend[ing] or modify[ing] existing vehicle development and associated contracts”, it wasn’t specific beyond that in terms of vehicle design.

However, as Space News reported Friday, the report accompanying the bill goes into additional detail about their desired vehicle design.

Read the Post, HERE.

Congressional Support Grows For Heavy-Lift

Frank Morring, Jr. & Irene Klotz
Washington, Cape Canaveral
Aviation Week

A small groundswell is rising in Congress for a faster start on the heavy-lift launch vehicle President Obama says he wants, but it may be swamped by the backwash from growing irritation over NASA’s sluggish production of justification for its “game-changing” new approach.

A bipartisan gang of 62 House members wants Obama to initiate “the immediate development and production of a heavy-lift launch vehicle that, in conjunction with the Orion crew exploration vehicle, may be used for either lunar or deep-space exploration.”

Their June 22 letter to Obama, circulated by Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Va.), follows word from Sen. Bill Nelson (D-Fla.) that a new NASA authorization with at least some bipartisan support would include both a heavy-lifter and a crew exploration vehicle leveraging “the workforce, contracts, assets and capabilities of the shuttle, Ares I and Orion efforts.”

But, while some lawmakers appear ready to compromise with the White House on ending the Constellation program that has been funding Orion, the Ares I crew exploration vehicle and other follow-ons to the retiring space shuttle fleet, other space leaders are moving in completely different directions.

Read more HERE.

NASA budget gets a boost

Bart Jansen
Florida Today

WASHINGTON — A key House panel agreed Tuesday to accept President Barack Obama's proposed funding increase for NASA but without taking a position on changing the agency's course.

The House appropriations subcommittee governing NASA unanimously approved $19 billion for the fiscal year starting Oct. 1, a nearly $276 million increase from the current year.

But approval came with a requirement that the House and Senate science committees, which have strongly opposed Obama's budget, agree on a NASA policy before the money is spent.

"Unfortunately, a determination about the direction of the space program has been effectively put on hold for well over a year," said Rep. Alan Mollohan, D-W.Va., who heads the subcommittee.

Congress has been unable to approve a budget blueprint for spending this year, so committees are starting to decide on spending without knowing precise amounts. Lawmakers could take the rest of the year negotiating a dozen spending bills that govern NASA and the rest of the federal government.

The panel's top Republican, Rep. Frank Wolf of Virginia, said it might be unrealistic to think Congress will approve a NASA policy this election year.

"We need a strong American space program," Wolf said. "I hope we can find a compromise because we need it."

More HERE.

"Heavy-Lift yes, EELV no?"

Jeff Foust
SpacePolitics.com

"While the Augustine committee wraps up its final report, NASA hasn’t been standing still waiting for it. In an article in Monday’s issue of The Space Review, I wrote about Bolden’s statements in his Space Transportation Association speech on Thursday about what NASA’s internal planning:"

"While Bolden didn’t mention any specifics in Washington, he did let slip a few details about what might be included on Monday at the IAC in Daejon, South Korea, Flightglobal.com reports. Bolden was clearly interested in developing a heavy-lift vehicle, saying that NASA was “costing” such a launcher, which the report believes is the Ares 5 “Lite” vehicle mentioned in the Augustine committee report instead of a shuttle-derived alternative or even simply re-estimating the development cost of the Ares 5 itself."

Read the Post, HERE.