Failure to Launch, Failure to Lead

President George H. W. Bush (1989-1993), flanked by First Lade Barbara Bush and Dr. Neil Armstrong on his right with Vice President (and head of the National Space Council Dan Quayle) with Apollo 11 command module pilot Michael Collins on his left, celebrates the 20th anniversary of the first manned landing on the Moon, July 20, 1989. The president announced the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI), the first major presidential initiative beyond Earth orbit, and successor to the Space Shuttle, since 1961.

Paul D. Spudis
The Once and Future Moon
Smithsonian Air & Space

In the aftermath of a major Space Shuttle accident, an incumbent President decides that our civil space program needs a bold new strategic direction.  In a major public speech, he outlines a path to return to the Moon and go to Mars.  The space agency responds with full-color sales brochures, committee meetings, community workshops, and a thousand charts outlining the steps they will take to carry out the new direction.  A couple of years pass, a new President takes office, and then – promptly cancels the initiative of the previous administration.

Sound familiar?  This has happened in our space history – twice.

President Bush, with Vice President Quayle, join the crew of Apollo 11
by the unused Lunar Module, now an exhibit at the National Air and
Space Museum, July 20, 1989.

In 1989, after much agency soul-searching following the loss of seven crew members aboard the Space Shuttle Challenger, President George H. W. Bush took to the steps of the National Air and Space Museum and announced what was soon dubbed the “Space Exploration Initiative," (SEI) a long-range program to send people beyond low Earth orbit, first to the Moon and then to Mars.  NASA responded to this challenge by outlining an architecture imaginatively named the “90-Day Study.”  It called for the development of new launch vehicles, new modules, transfer spacecraft and numerous robotic elements, including lunar and martian orbiters and landers (most of them extensions of existing hardware and designs).  Financial analysts somehow arrived at an aggregate cost of $600 billion (which also included assembly of ISS) and everyone gasped.

After numerous politicians and bureaucrats scoffed disapproval, a special ad hoc group was convened to re-examine the objectives and devise a less expensive approach for implementing SEI.  Their report was delivered and immediately put on the shelf.  In the ensuing three years, a new NASA Administrator was named, Congress refused to increase the NASA budget, and President Clinton cancelled SEI.

In 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia disintegrated during re-entry, killing its crew of seven.  The agency investigated and concluded that foam shed during launch destroyed the integrity of the vehicle’s thermal protection system, causing the loss of the Shuttle.  In January of the following year, President George W. Bush announced a new strategic direction for space – the “Vision for Space Exploration," (VSE) a long-range program to send people beyond low Earth orbit – first to the Moon and then to Mars.  NASA responded to this challenge by outlining an architecture to implement the new direction that called for the development of new launch vehicles, new modules, transfer spacecraft, and numerous robotic elements (including orbiters and landers for both the Moon and Mars – most of them extensions of existing hardware and designs).

President George W. Bush (2001-2009), following the release of the official investigation into the causes of the Columbia accident, announces the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) at NASA Headquarters in Washington in 2004.

Once again a committee was convened to examine the agency’s implementation of the new direction.  Another report was written and put on a shelf.  During numerous meetings and workshops spread over several years, an architecture emerged – accompanied by many charts (all electronic this time – technology marches on!). President Obama terminated the VSE in April, 2010 during a speech at the John F. Kennedy Space Center (“We choose NOT to go to the Moon!” – the historical resonances astound!).

What, if anything, is to be learned from these two sequences of events?  According to Mark Albrecht, Executive Secretary of the National Space Council in the Bush-41 White House, it means that the space agency is fundamentally broken – comprised of various constituencies that protect turf and resist implementing any new direction that may challenge or threaten their existence.  However, there is another possible reading of the situation.  The space agency was in a very different predicament during SEI than it was during the VSE.  In 1990, NASA had a clear but unfulfilled mission – Space Station Freedom, for which not a single element had yet been launched.  NASA’s anxiety at the time was uncertainty in being able to execute both Station and SEI simultaneously.  The oft-quoted 30-year, $600 billion cost of SEI, repeated by the media to denigrate the effort, included construction and operation of Station, which was to serve as both an orbital platform for missions beyond LEO and as a source of hardware (e.g., habitation modules) that could be adapted to trans-LEO missions.  Even so, most of the costing assumptions in the 90-Day Study were inflated beyond reason, presumably following in the footsteps of former NASA Administrator James Webb, who after reportedly being told that Apollo would cost about $20 billion, asked for more than $35 billion as a cushion.

In contrast, the VSE came along just as NASA was in the middle of ISS construction, with the program’s end clearly in sight.  There was no future plan for human spaceflight beyond Shuttle/ISS and the agency sorely needed some high-level direction.  The idea of Shuttle replacement came from the Columbia Accident Investigations Board report, which contended that the Shuttle system was inherently dangerous and that we ought to develop a new space transportation system as soon as possible.  In contrast to uninformed reporting and Internet mythology, President Bush did not “retire” the Shuttle – he ordered that it first be brought back to flight status (so that ISS construction could be completed) and then transitioned and replaced with new human spacecraft capable of journeys beyond LEO (which became the now-cancelled Project Constellation).  In contrast to SEI, the VSE came to NASA with price limits already in place – after a small incremental increase in the early years, it was to cost no more than we were then spending on human spaceflight (about $8 billion per year) with funding available from the gradual decline in spending on the Shuttle/Station program.  Finally, unlike SEI, which never had much Congressional support, NASA was given two Authorization bills (in 2005 and 2008) that strongly endorsed the VSE (many VSE goals, though ignored, remain in the current 2010 Authorization).

President Barack Obama (2009- ) joins Buzz Aldrin, Michael
Collins and Dr. Neil Armstrong at the White House to mark the
40th Anniversary of Apollo 11, July 20, 2009 [White House].

Although neither SEI nor the VSE succeeded in their principal objectives of sending people beyond low Earth orbit, they did manage to greatly advance our understanding of just what is at stake.  In the case of the former, a variety of people from the defense and civil space sectors worked together on SEI, creating networks that advanced an outbound agenda.  One accomplishment was the Clementine mission, a joint effort by the Department of Defense’s Strategic Defense Initiative Organization and NASA.  Flying in 1994, Clementine successfully mapped the entire Moon in eleven spectral bands, mapping its mineral composition in detail.  Clementine made the first global topographic map of that body and most significantly, found evidence for the presence of water ice in the dark areas near the south pole of the Moon.  The success of Clementine led to the Lunar Prospector mission, a robotic orbiter flown under NASA’s Discovery program, that both confirmed the excess hydrogen at the poles of the Moon and globally mapped the Moon’s chemical composition.

The intriguing results from Clementine and Lunar Prospector resulted in an international fleet of six spacecraft being sent to the Moon in the past decade, adding to our knowledge of the processes, history and potential utility of that body.  From this exploration, we now know that the Moon contains millions of tons of harvestable water.  We possess detailed maps of lunar physical and compositional properties.  In short, we now know that the Moon is habitable and is both an appropriate near-term destination for people and a unique enabling asset for future spaceflight within and beyond the Earth-Moon system.

Now, just as we find the Moon to be an attractive destination, we shrink away from the challenge, watching as others blaze trails we once traveled.  We willingly accept the pablum to not fret over new space powers who do not cancel their programs.  We are told they have not yet done all that we have and that we still carry the mantle of the world’s leading space power.  This is not logical. Similar thoughts once prevailed in Portugal, during an earlier age of exploration.  One doesn’t assume or retain the mantle of leadership by fiat or declaration – it must be earned and exercised.  Perhaps the real issue is not whether NASA is up to the task but rather, whether we as Americans are blind to the truth, unable to recognize that by having our nation withdraw from this arena, that we are retreating from our position, thereby ceding our prosperity, leadership and greatness to other nations who do have the will and the vision to press forward.

Originally published at his Smithsonian Air & Space blog The Once and Future Moon, Dr. Spudis is a senior staff scientist at the Lunar and Planetary Institute. The opinions expressed are those of the author and are better informed than average.

Let's argue about the right things.

President Theodore Roosevelt's "Big Stick," displayed in the form of sixteen gleaming modern battleships with 14,000 sailors that soon became known as "The Great White Fleet." Over 1908 it was a substantive pageant that circled the world, making 20 ports of call and signaling America's arrival as a world power.

Paul D. Spudis
The Once & Future Moon
Smithsonian Air & Space

We seem to be in one of those periods in which basic reasons for doing what we do as a nation are called into question.  This includes our national civil space program, which for the last few years has engaged in an extended period of back-biting and navel-gazing.  Much of this “debate” has focused on either or both of two points: what rocket to build and where to go, and not on sustainability.

In an era of limited resources, our challenge is to create a worthwhile space program with an expenditure rate that falls at or below a level perceived as affordable.  Given this reality (regardless of prevailing agency direction or assertions about projected deep space destinations) it is highly likely that cislunar space will be the sphere of space operations for the coming decade or two. Thus the questions should be:  What are we doing in space and why are we doing it?  If the answer is a series of space exploration “firsts” (flags-and-footprints forever), that model will require specific activities and missions.  If the answer is that an incrementally developed transportation infrastructure is desired, one that creates an expanding sphere of human operations, then such a model requires a different set of specific activities and missions.

Thus, the real debate is not about launch vehicles or spacecraft or even destinations; it is about the long-term – the paradigm or template of space operations.  One model requires mega-rockets to distant targets for touch-and-go missions; for convenience, I’ll call it the “Apollo” template (no denigration intended).  The other model is an incremental, go-somewhere-to-stay-and-then-expand-onwards mindset – call it the “Shuttle” template (again, same disclaimer).  The one that you adopt and follow depends on what purpose you believe human spaceflight serves.

Because Mars may harbor former or existing life, NASA has presumed that it is our “ultimate destination” in space.  In effect, the entire focus of the human spaceflight effort has devolved into a huge science project – “The Quest for Life” (which means finding pond scum, not ET).  Thus, debate about what to build, where to go and how to do it must be formulated towards attainment of Mars.

This unspoken assumption has been at the root of most space objective studies for the past 20 years.  Mars was the end point of President George H.W. Bush’s Space Exploration Initiative, President George W. Bush’s Vision for Space Exploration, of former Lockheed-Martin President Norm Augustine’s two reports, and a myriad of space groups and societies.  From the 1990′s to the present, a multi-billion dollar robotic campaign has sent mission after mission to Mars, each discovering that the red planet once had liquid water.  This mania for Mars and preoccupation with possible life there, has blinkered our perceptions of the space program and distorted our reality of what is possible or attainable on reasonable time scales with available resources.

Long term, the goal for human spaceflight is to create the capability to go anywhere we choose, for as long as we need, and do whatever we want to in space.  For the sake of argument, if one accepts such a goal, which model is more amenable to implementing it: the Apollo template or the Shuttle template?

If our goal is to “sail on the ocean of space,” we need a navy.  Navies don’t operate with just one class of ship because one class isn’t capable of doing all that is necessary.  Not all ships will look or operate the same because they have different purposes and destinations.  We need transports, way stations, supply depots, and ports.  In space terms, these consist of one to get people to and from space (LEO), one to get them to and from points beyond LEO, way stations and outposts at GEO, L-1, low lunar orbit, and to the lunar surface.  To fuel and provision our space navy, we require supply (propellant) depots in LEO, L-1 and on the lunar surface.  Ports of call are all the places we may go to with this system.  Initially, those ports are satellites in various orbits which require service, maintenance and replacement with larger, distributed systems.  Later, our harbor will be the surface of the Moon, to harvest its resources, thereby creating more capability and provisions from space.  Reliable and frequent access to the entire Solar System, not one or two destinations, should be our ultimate goal.

By designing and building mission-specific vehicles and elements, the “Apollo” template forfeits going everywhere and doing everything.  However, adopting the “Shuttle” model does not preclude going to Mars.  In fact, I contend that to go to Mars in an affordable manner that sustains repeated trips, one needs the infrastructure provided by a space faring navy.  Building a series of one-off spacecraft – huge launch vehicles to dash to Mars for expensive, public relations extravaganzas will eventually put us right back in the box we’re in now.

We have been arguing about the wrong things.  It is the mindset of the space program that needs re-thinking – not the next destination, not the next launch vehicle, and not the next spacecraft.  How can we change the discussion?  First, we need to understand and articulate the true choices so that people can see and evaluate the different approaches and requirements.  Second, we need to develop sample architectures that fit the requirements for “affordable incrementalism.”  Finally, we need to get such plans in front of the decision makers.  There is no guarantee that they will accept it or even listen to the arguments for it.  But right now, they are completely ignorant about it.

A cost-effective, sustainable human spaceflight program must be incremental and cumulative.  Our space program must continually expand our reach, creating new capabilities over time.  Moreover, it should contribute to compelling national economic, scientific and security interests.  Building a lasting and reusable space transportation system does that, whereas a series of PR stunt missions will not.  The original vision of the Shuttle system was to incrementally move into the Solar System – first a Shuttle to-and-from LEO, then Station as a jumping off platform and then beyond LEO into cislunar space.  We have the parts from the now retired Shuttle system and an assembled and working International Space Station.  We can use these legacy pieces to build an affordable system to access the near regions and resources of cislunar space.  In this new age of austerity, perhaps we will finally acquire the means to build our pathway to the stars.

Originally published September 17, 2011 at his Smithsonian Air & Space blog The Once and Future Moon, Dr. Paul Spudis is a Senior Staff Scientist at the Lunar and Planetary Institute in Houston. The opinions expressed are those of the author and are better informed than average.

Will NASA’s embrace kill NewSpace?

A notional scene showing the besieged Constellation lunar lander Altair, composed of Apollo, LRO, Kaguya & Google Earth data to create an "accurate-looking" scene of a landing near the wrinkle ridges and ghost craters of southern Mare Crisium. The site is among fifty Constellation "Regions of Interest."

Taylor Dinerman
The Space Review

Whatever her motives were, when Senator Barbara Mikulski (D-MD) destroyed the George H.W. Bush Space Exploration Initiative in 1992, she demonstrated how a single powerful senator could wreck any president’s proposals, especially on a seemingly marginal issue like civil space policy. She went through the NASA budget and zeroed out anything that even remotely resembled funding for SEI. It took NASA many years to recover from those drastic cuts to the human space exploration technology program.

The resentment aimed at SEI is nothing compared to what the NewSpace industry now faces on Capitol Hill. The cancellation of the Constellation program proposed in the 2011 budget is facing a bipartisan firestorm in Congress. It is doubtful that the President will want to make a special effort to support the new NASA program. His threat to veto the 2010 defense budget if it included money for the alternative F-35 engine turned out to be empty. The thousands of jobs and the irreplaceable expertise that this new plan throws away are far more important to the members of Congress, especially in the current economic climate, than are the arguments and promises from the new team at NASA.

In spite of its flaws—and if anyone says there is such a thing as a flawless government program ask them what they’ve been smoking—Constellation balanced the technological, political, and legal realities of today’s government environment. The new program is the product of a philosophy that, while it may be promising in the very long term, is simply not ready for prime time.

If the Moon program could be described as belonging to the 20th century, the NewSpace industry is beginning to look as if they belong to the 18th century. Like French courtiers wandering the halls of Versailles looking for a favor from the King, individuals who used to be regarded as brave entrepreneurs will now haunt the corridors of power looking for a subsidy or an earmark. They will prove their technical expertise by writing proposals that are perfectly adapted to the prevailing bureaucratic winds. It may be good business, but it does not have much to do with 21st century market capitalism.

Now that the NewSpace industry is in a direct fight with the powerful members of Congress they may find that in spite of support from NASA’s leadership, they lack the political strength overcome the opposition. If the men and women who sit on the appropriations committees feel their interests and even their political survival are threatened, they will strike back, and strike back hard.

Read the full article, HERE.

The Vision Thing

July 20, 1989, National Air & Space Museum, Washington, DC - Celebration of the 20th Anniversary of Apollo 11 and chosen venue for then-President George H.W. Bush's announcement of a proposed Space Exploration Initiative. (Left to Right, Chair of the National Space Council Vice President Dan Quayle, President Bush, Dr. Neil Armstrong, Buzz Aldrin and Michael Collins, the crew of Apollo 11 [NASA Image 89-H-382].

Wayne Hale
NASA Blogs

George Herbert Walker Bush, the 41st President, calls Houston home. He and Barbara can be frequently seen at Astros baseball games, he made his early career in business here, was a congressman from here, even once taught a course as an adjunct professor at my alma mater, Rice University.

As you may recall, Mr. Bush failed in his re-election bid; there were a number of reasons for his loss, but one of the frequently cited reasons was “the vision thing”. The critics felt that he had not clearly articulated his vision for the future of the nation, which is a vital function that an effective chief executive must do. Keep that in mind.

On July 20, 1989 – the 20th anniversary of the first lunar landing – President G. H. W. Bush had made a speech proposing what would come to be known as the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI). This proposal included a permanent return to the Moon and human missions to Mars. In spite of the bold and visionary words, this initiative quickly failed.

Thor Hogan has written an excellent book on the history of the fiasco. His book is “Mars Wars, The Rise and Fall of the Space Exploration Initiative” NASA SP-2007-4410, August 2007. I highly recommend this book for those who are interested in how national space policy is made and how federal agencies can be dysfunctional at times. Dr. Hogan is a Professor of Political Science at the Illinois Institute of Technology in Chicago. Let me reiterate – I highly recommend this book if you are interested in these topics.

When “Mars Wars” was first published in 2007, it was widely circulated in NASA management and caused considerable discussion. Everyone was trying to make sure to avoid the mistakes made in 1989 and create a successful program. There are many lessons to be learned from that earlier experience, and Dr. Hogan hit many of them.

The most frequently cited lesson from SEI is the need to build a “sustainable” program. That is a shorthand way of saying stay within an affordable budget. One of the principle reasons the Space Exploration Initiative failed was its price tag. The SEI package was dead on arrival at Congress because of the high cost. Trying to apply this lesson, the NASA program of the last five years to send crews to the Moon and Mars strove mightily to remain within the budget line announced in 2004.

The notional Lunar Exploration Vehicle that arose from NASA's sketching out, in broad strokes, a frame work for the 1989 Space Exploration Initiative [Report of the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars, November 1989].

But back to 1989, because there are other lessons to be learned there. That year I was a rookie Space Shuttle Flight Director, learning the ropes in Mission Control, and I had no time to be involved in SEI. But I was immersed in the NASA culture of the day and I remember that time with great clarity. Dr. Hogan’s “Mars Wars” book does a wonderful job of capturing the motivations of agency personnel in those days.

It was a bare three years following the Challenger accident and the wound was still raw. Challenger was a driving factor in the SEI story. Remember that widely held beliefs are important whether they are accurate or not. That is because what people believe to be true motivates them. So take the following paragraph not necessarily as historical truth but as the mythos which psychologically undergird folks running SEI.

NASA was not allowed to build the shuttle the “right” way, that is, to make both engineeringly elegant and safe. Lives were lost in Challenger due to basic design choices forced on the agency by severe budgetary restrictions. In the early 1970s, when NASA was authorized to design and build a revolutionary reusable winged space vehicle, the Office of Management and Budget capped the total development cost of the shuttle at $5 billion. (Money went further back then.) This cap was far too low to allow development of several of the more innovative design options. Fly back liquid fueled boosters were out of the question, for example. Operational costs were higher because of choices required to keep the development costs low. Safety was lower. So we got an aero-space plane with a big dumb drop tank and two scaled up JATO bottles.

Read Wayne Hales post, HERE.